Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Private Insurance by Oikonomou, Rigas
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with
Private Insurance
Rigas Oikonomou
HEC Montreal
2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55726/
MPRA Paper No. 55726, posted 7. May 2014 15:06 UTC
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Private
Insurance ∗
Rigas Oikonomou †
HEC Montreal
October 2013
Abstract
I present a model of optimal contracts between firms and workers, under limited
commitment and with worker savings. A central feature of the model is that firms
can provide insurance against unemployment, by targeting a path of wages that
encourages wealth accumulation. I provide an analytical expression for the scope of
private insurance measured in the drop of consumption that the worker suffers when
the match terminates. I then consider how government policy affects risk sharing
through private markets. I find that unemployment benefits should be large and
frontloaded. The government has the incentive to drive the allocation to the point
where the firm’s participation constraint binds. At this point wages are equal to the
match productivity in every period and thus private risk sharing is crowded out.
However, the drop in consumption in unemployment is minimized. Moreover, the
implications of the theory of optimal contracts are assessed relative to the standard
model of heterogeneous households, whereby wealth is utilized for self-insurance
purposes. I show that under the optimal UI policy, the contract model and the
heterogeneous households model are equivalent.
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1 Introduction
Whether governments should provide insurance against the risk that individuals face in
the labor market has been a long standing debate in economics. Much of the discussion
over the scope of public policy centers around the notion that it can crowd out the private
insurance arrangements of individuals, with a widespread belief that the scope of policy
is limited when such arrangements are in place. Theoretical work seeking to describe this
tradeoff is ample: For example Attanasio and Rios Rull (2000) and Krueger and Perri
(2011) consider economies where private insurance is a contract under limited commitment
between risk averse households, and show that public insurance can crowd out private risk
sharing with adverse effects on welfare. Moreover, Hansen and Imhrohoroglu (1992), Wang
and Williamson (2002) among others, study the properties of optimal unemployment
insurance within the heterogeneous households model of precautionary savings. They
illustrate that unemployment benefits discourage workers from accumulating wealth, thus
reducing the scope of self insurance in the model.
This paper studies the impact of public insurance in the form of unemployment ben-
efits, in an economy where private insurance is a contract under limited commitment
offered by firms to their workforce. The contract considered is broadly similar to the self
enforcing wage models of Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Rudanko (2009, 2011) whereby
limited commitment means that the firm and the worker have to be better off in the match
than to separate. As a consequence private risk sharing is partial because the allocation
has to satisfy two participation constraints.
In contrast to Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Rudanko (2009, 2011), I assume that
workers have access a storage technology and therefore can accumulate assets over time.
Allowing for workers to save is novel in the literature, and therefore I study thoroughly
the properties of the optimal allocation. I show that the optimal contract offers a higher
wage, to some workers, at the start of the job, in order to encourage wealth accumulation.
By this initial investment in wealth, the worker is (partially) insured against the risk
of unemployment, and in particular she can ward off the risk of an early dismissal. I
obtain an analytical expression for the scope of private risk sharing, measured in terms
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of the percentage drop in consumption in unemployment. Moreover, I show that this
quantity depends on the firm’s and the worker’s relative discount rates, and on whether
the participation constraints bind.
I then turn to investigate the properties of the optimal UI scheme. I obtain the
following results: First, it is optimal to target a UI scheme that maximizes the region
over which firms earn zero profits and their participation constraints bind, in the steady
state and over the stationary distribution. This becomes particularly evident when I
consider the optimal timing of unemployment insurance: I show that it is preferable to
pay out benefits in the first period (quarter) of an unemployment spell as frontloading
benefits is most effective in tightening the firm’s constraint. Second, I establish that
under the optimal policy the contract offered by firms to their workforce is essentially flat
and wages are set equal to productivity in each period. In this sense there is a complete
crowding out of wealth accumulation, through the upfront wage arrangement described
previously.
To understand these results it is important to outline several properties of the model.
First, as noted previously the relative discount rates of workers and firms exert an influ-
ence over the allocation. Under the standard notation let β be the discount rate of the
worker, 1
R
the discount factor of the firm and r be the market interest rate on savings.
Further note that an equilibrium under incomplete financial markets exists if it holds that
βr < 1 (see Huggett (1993)). I prove analytically that in the case where R = 1
β
, (as is
customary to assume in the literature of optimal contracts) the allocation features: (1)
underinsurance against unemployment, in the sense that consumption drops when the
firm and the worker separate, and (2) the drop in consumption is less when the firm’s
participation constraint is binding. With R = 1
β
> r the firm has access to a technology
that offers a higher rate of return than r. It is then worthwhile to give lower wages initially
to some workers, (in particular workers with high initial wealth) run down assets and fi-
nance a higher consumption path subsequently. I show that in the model this arrangement
makes the firm’s participation constraint bind, because promising to increase wages above
productivity in the future, gives a negative value to the firm. As the firm’s constraint
rules out negative profits, the firm ends offering a flat contract where wages are equal
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to productivity. In contrast, when individuals are relatively poor and the participation
constraint is slack, the wage profile is frontloaded, leading to asset accumulation.
Consider now a UI scheme that gives a benefit level higher than wages for the first
period of unemployment, and subsequently reduces unemployment income considerably.
Given this policy the newly unemployed agent is induced to save in order to ward off the
risk of a prolonged unemployment spell. Since typically, a large fraction of the unem-
ployed find a job after one quarter, these individuals arrive to their new jobs with a high
wealth endowment. As argued previously, having high wealth initially, implies that the
firms participation constraint is binding. For this reason in the model, UI policies that
concentrate payments to the first period of unemployment, perform considerably better.
Under the optimal policy, all individuals in the economy receive a wage equal to the match
productivity.
This result, that wages are equal to productivity under the optimal UI scheme, makes
the model equivalent to a heterogeneous households model whereby wealth is accumulated
for precautionary savings purposes. As discussed previously, there is a sizable literature
which considers the role optimal unemployment insurance in this class of models (for
example Hansen and Imhrohoroglu (1992), Wang and Williamson (2002) among others).
One of the key innovations of my paper is therefore to replace the assumption that workers
are paid their marginal product each period, with the optimal contracting scheme, and
to study its implications over several important dimensions. I provide, with the use of
analytical examples, a thorough description of the differences for the consumption and
savings behavior of individuals, between the two environments. I show that under the
optimal contract and when the participation constraint of the firm is slack, consumption
is constant over the life of the match and wealth accumulation takes place in one period,
through the frontloaded wage property discussed previously. In contrast, under precau-
tionary savings it takes several periods for the agent to build a buffer stock of assets, and
for consumption to reach the stationary point. This implies that the optimal contract is
particularly useful as an insurance device against early separation shocks. It also implies
that the steady state distributions of wealth in the two models are quite different (for
benefit levels different than the optimal policy). However, when the initial wealth en-
4
dowment is above the stationary level, and the firms participation constraint is binding I
show that the two models deliver essentially the same (decreasing) path for consumption
and wealth. The equivalence carries over to the optimal UI policy.
This paper is also related to a recent literature studying the effect of public policy on
private insurance assuming limited commitment frictions in contracts between risk averse
individuals (eg. Krueger and Perri (2011), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002), Attanasio
and Rios Rull (2001)). Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002) use a model where unemployment
insurance is provided by the government but also by extended families. They show that
government benefits lead to more than one for one reductions in intrafamily insurance
when the later is subject to limited commitment considerations. In the context of redis-
tributive taxation, Krueger and Perri (2011) reach a similar conclusion. In Attanasio and
Rios Rull (2000) public insurance takes the form of a reduction in aggregate uncertainty.
Their results highlight that such interventions may reduce welfare, through adverse effects
in the realm of private risk sharing. My paper is related to this work though the focus here
is risk sharing provided by firms to their workforce. This focus is well grounded given the
empirical support for the self enforcing wage model that I utilize (see for example Thomas
and Worrall (2007) and the references therein).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the economic environment. Section
3 discusses the implications of the optimal contract. Section 4 contains the main results.
Section 5 discusses several extensions of the baseline model. A final section concludes.
2 The Model
There is a continuum (measure one) of infinitely lived, risk averse agents with preferences
of the following form:
(1) E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(log(ct)− v(st))
where ct denotes the consumption of a general multipurpose good and v(st) (where
v(0) = 0, vs(st) > 0 and vss(st) > 0) denotes the disutility of search. β is the discount
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factor.
Each period, a fraction e = 1 − u of all individuals in the economy are employed,
matched with firms in joint production, and the remaining u agents are unemployed
waiting for a job offer to arrive. The arrival rate of job offers to an unemployed agent is
given by γ(st), where γ is a technology that maps search effort st, to the job finding
probability. When matched with a firm the employed agent (worker) produces y units
of output per period. The firm does not search actively for a worker, and when the job
starts the firm is assumed to earn zero profits in expectation. Moreover, employed agents
also don’t search (hence st = 0 for them) but their matches terminate at an exogenous
rate λ per unit of time. When this occurs they become unemployed.
Let j = 0, 1, 2, .... denote the number of periods that an individual has spent in
unemployment prior to the current period. An agent with an index j is at her j + 1
period as unemployed. Therefore j = 0 applies to a newly unemployed agent. The
government provides insurance against unemployment in the form of benefits denoted by
bj. Benefits depend on the index j to show that the income received from the government
varies with the duration of the spell. Not all unemployed individuals are eligible for the
scheme: There is a maximum horizon m (duration of non-employment spell) beyond
which the unemployment income is assumed to be zero (i.e. bj = 0 ∀j ≥ m) and for
all j < m the level of income is a constant b. To finance benefits, taxes are levied on
employed individuals in the amount τ each period. It is assumed that the government
runs a balanced budget. Therefore it must be that eτ =
∑
j<m ujb where uj denotes the
total number of unemployed agents who are running their j + 1 period of joblessness.
Finally, financial markets are incomplete and agents can a trade non-contingent asset
subject to an ad hoc (no borrowing) constraint a = 0. The gross interest rate on the asset
is denoted by r. Note that the equilibrium in this economy with incomplete financial
markets requires that βr < 1 to be well defined (for asset positions to not diverge).
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2.1 Value Functions
2.1.1 Employed Agents
As discussed previously, each match generates a per period output equal to y. Because
firms earn zero profits at the start of the match, one possible firm-worker contract is to
pay a wage y each period and let the worker rely purely on savings to insure against
the job separation shock. This arrangement, however, is not necessarily optimal: Insofar
as the firm is risk neutral, and the worker is risk averse, there ought to be a different
arrangement, that (Pareto) dominates the flat wage contract.
This section characterizes recursively the optimal contract, as a Pareto optimal allo-
cation, following the literature on self enforcing labor contracts. I let Jt be the present
discounted (profit) value to the firm at time t, at the stock of wealth of the worker,
and Wt the lifetime utility of the worker. The latter will be specified as a function of
at and Jt. The optimal program consists of choosing a sequence of control variables, to
maximize Wt subject to a sequence of constraints. Note that it is important to consider
values of Jt that are different from zero, even though it is assumed that all matches start
at J0 = 0. As will become evident shortly, for a wage profile that is not constant (flat)
over the life of the match, we anticipate that J0 = 0 but Jt 6= 0 for some t > 0, i.e. that
the total wage paid to the worker between periods 0 and t − 1 is not (necessarily) equal
to ty. Moreover, to ensure that the sequence of payments is such that both the firm and
the worker (weakly) prefer to be matched, rather than to separate, I impose two sustain-
ability constraints on the equilibrium allocation: at each point in time it must be that
Jt ≥ 0, and Wt ≥ U(at, 0) where U(at, 0) is the lifetime utility of a newly unemployed
individual.
My formulation here of the worker’s program follows closely the work of Thomas and
Worrall (1988), Ligon et al (2000, 2002) and Rudanko (2009). As is customary I drop all
time subscripts in writing the recursive representation of the program as follows:
(2) W (a, J) = max
a′≥a,J ′
log(c) + β(λU(a′, 0) + (1− λ)W (a′, J ′))
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Subject to the constraint set:
a′ = ra+ w − τ − c(3)
J ≤ y − w + 1− λ
R
J ′(4)
J ′ ≥ 0 and W (a′, J ′) ≥ U(a′, 0)(5)
Primes denote next period variables. Equation (4) is the so called promise keeping con-
straint which imposes that the firm’s expected profit is at least J over the life of the
match. Under the contract the firm earns y−w this period, where w denotes the wage,
and discounts the future profit value ( J ′) at a rate 1−λ
R
. Notice that the discount rate for
the firm, R, maybe different than the market interest rate r. In equation (2) the worker
solves for next period wealth a′, and for a continuation utility J ′ for the firm. 1 Finally,
the two sustainability constraints described previously, ensuring that the allocation does
not violate participation are imposed in equation (5).
2.1.2 Unemployed Agents
Equilibrium payoffs for unemployed individuals solve the following functional equation:
(6) U(a, j) = max
a′≥a,s
log(c)− v(s) + β γ(s) W (a′, 0) + β(1− γ(s)) U(a′, j + 1))
Subject to the constraint set:
(7) a′ = ra+ bj − c
As discussed above, when the job starts it must always be that J = 0 so that firms make
zero profits in expectation.
1Notice that under the specification of the utility function of the worker, the promise keeping and the
budget constraints hold with equality. Therefore consumption and wages could be eliminated as control
variables from (2).
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2.2 Competitive Equilibrium
This section describes the stationary competitive equilibrium. It consists of a set of value
functions {U(a, j),W (a, J)} for unemployed and employed workers respectively, and a
set of decision rules on asset holdings {a′e(a, J), a′u(a, j)}, the firms continuation value
J ′(a, J), and search the intensity s(a, j). It also consists of a level of taxes τ and an
invariant measure µ of agents across assets, employment status and J such that:
1) Agents optimize: {U(a, j),W (a, J)} solve functional equations 2 and 6 above and
optimal policies derive.
2) Taxes and benefits are consistent with Budget Balance: eτ =
∑
j<m ujbj
3) The measure µ is consistent: In particular the law of motion of µ can be represented
as:
µ(e,A,J ) = (1− λ)
∫
a′(e,a,J)∈A,J ′(a,J)∈J
d µ(e,a,J) + I0∈J
∑
j
∫
a′u(a,j)∈A
γ(s(a, j))d µ(u,a,j)
µ(u,A,j) = Ij=0(λ)
∫
a′e(a,J)∈A
d µ(e,a,J) + Ij>0
∫
a′u(a,j−1)∈A
(1− γ(s(a, j − 1)))d µ(u,a,j−1)
where A and J are subsets of the relevant state space and µ(u,A,j) and µ(e,A,J ) are the
probability distributions conditional on employment status. 2
3 Implications
This section studies the implications of the optimal contract. I show how the sustain-
ability (participation) constraints and the model parameters impact risk sharing and the
sequence of wages that the worker receives. Moreover, I compare the properties of the
optimal allocation that solves program (2) with those of a model where the worker re-
ceives y each period. As discussed previously, the latter case corresponsds to the standard
environment of heterogeneous households with wealth accumulation and unemployment
risks (for example Hansen and Imhrohoroglu (1992) and Wang and Williamson (2002)).
2For brevity I use the same number of arguments in µ(e,.,.) and µ(u,.,.). The third argument however
is J (promised utility) if the agent is employed and j (duration of the spell) if she is unemployed.
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3.1 Intertemporal Behavior
In the Appendix I derive the first order conditions from program (2). I establish that the
allocation satisfies the following equations:
u′(cet )
1− λ
R
= β(1− λ)u′(cet+1) + φ1t+1u′(cet+1)− φ2t+1(8)
u′(cet ) = βrλu
′(cut+1) + βr(1− λ)u′(cet+1) + χt + βrφ1t+1(u′(cet+1)− u′(cut+1))(9)
where u′ denotes the worker’s marginal utility (under log utility the inverse of consump-
tion), φ1t+1 and φ
2
t+1 are the multipliers on the participation constraints for the worker
and the firm respectively, and χt is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint. I use time
subscripts to avoid double primes in the next periods marginal utility of consumption.
cet is the consumption of an employed agent in t, and c
u
t is the analogous object of an
unemployed individual.
Equation (8) gives the optimal consumption path. Note that it has been customary in
the literature of optimal contracts to assume that workers and firms have equal discount
rates, so that R = 1
β
. If in addition we posit that φ1t+1 = φ
2
t+1 = 0 then the optimal
contract gives a constant consumption path to the worker. If however, R < 1
β
(for example
in the case of R = r) then (8) implies that the consumption sequence is decreasing over
the life of the match.
To understand how the participation constraints influence the allocation assume first
that φ2t+1 > 0: In this case the worker’s marginal utility of consumption in period t
exceeds the marginal utility in t + 1 and therefore the level of consumption must drop,
giving a higher share to the firm in the future. The converse holds if φ1t+1 > 0. In this
case it is the worker that needs to be made better off, and therefore consumption must
increase tomorrow, when the worker’s participation constraint binds. Notice that it can
never be that both φ1t+1 and φ
2
t+1 are greater than zero simultaneously in a match with
positive surplus.
Equation (9) is a modified Euler equation (see Ligon et al (2000)). Off corners, when
φ1t+1 = 0 and χt = 0 it equates the cost of a unit of savings today measured in terms of
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the marginal utility, with the benefit from the additional unit, expressed as the discounted
(expected) future marginal utility. However, equating the cost and benefit from savings
does not hold if φ1t+1 > 0 i.e. when the participation constraint of the worker binds. Note
that since assets influence the utility levels W (a, J) and U(a, 0), they also influence
the tightness of the participation constraint. Therefore, the Euler equation needs to
be augmented to include the last term. Assuming that u′(cet+1) − u′(cut+1) < 0 i.e.
that consumption drops when the agent becomes unemployed, (9) suggests that when
φ1t+1 > 0 (and χt = 0) the worker is savings constrained in the sense that u
′(cet ) <
βrλu′(cut+1) + βr(1− λ)u′(cet+1). In this case, the influence of the participation constraint
is to reduce the amount of wealth accumulated, because more wealth would further tighten
the constraint. 3
Finally, note that the value of φ2t+1 exerts no influence on the inter-temporal Euler
equation. Actual savings are equal to desired savings when φ2t+1 > 0. This result is
important for the following reason: It suggests that in solving for the optimal contract
in (2) it is not necessary to consider the Euler equation as an additional constraint, if
we focus on cases where only the firm’s participation constraint may bind. As I will
later illustrate, the equilibrium in the model features this property. Therefore the Euler
equation will hold in the model.
3.2 Insurance Against Unemployment
I now consider the properties of the optimal allocation focusing on the implications for
the agent’s consumption path in unemployment. By deriving the ratio of the worker’s
consumption in employment, in a given period, relative to her consumption if she were to
lose her job in that period, I characterize the insurance value of the optimal contract. In
the Appendix I show that rearranging (8) and (9) we can get the following expression:
(10)
(cet+1)
(cut+1)
= 1 +
(R− r)
r(λ− φ1t+1)
− ω + R
1− λ
1
r(λ− φ1t+1)
(φ1t+1 −
φ2t+1
u′(cet+1)
)
3Consider the following argument: Since cet+1 must increase to make the worker better off in employ-
ment, and since u′(cet+1)− u′(cut+1) < 0 and marginal utilities are the partial derivatives of the lifetime
utilities with respect to wealth, should the rise in consumption be financed by savings it would tighten
the constraint (see Ligon et al (2000)).
11
where ω = χt
u′(cet+1)βr(λ−φ1t+1) .
There are several noteworthy features: First, note that off corners, the right hand side
of (10) becomes: 1 + (R
r
− 1) 1
λ
. In the case where R = r this condition implies that the
firm insures the worker perfectly against the event of separation, as consumption does not
fall when in unemployment. However, if R = 1
β
> r, the unemployment spell leads to a
drop of consumption that is proportional to the difference in the rates of return.
To understand how relative discounting affects the allocation, note that since the
storage technology possessed by the worker delivers a return equal to r and because the
firm is risk neutral and is assumed not to face borrowing constraints, the firm effectively
has access to a storage technology that earns a superior rate of return if R = 1
β
. It is then
worthwhile for the worker to accept a lower wage when the match starts (say in period
t = 0), and enjoy higher wages in the future. Notice that under the previous results,
in this case consumption stays constant over the life of the match (i.e. cet = c
e
t+1). It
follows that the lower wage in t = 0 does not result to lower consumption but rather the
impact is to reduce the wealth invested for period t + 1. As (10) reveals assets are then
held constant in all future periods, since the ratio of marginal utilities in (10) will also be
constant.
Note that the above argument should not be construed to mean that the initial wage
offered to the worker is below productivity, in which case assets are run down when
the match starts. Generally, because wealth is the instrument via which the risk of
unemployment can be mitigated, should the firm offer initially a wage greater than y and
thereby encourage asset accumulation, the drop in consumption in unemployment is less.
This will be the case, even if we assume R = 1
β
. The argument above highlights that the
investment in wealth is smaller than if we have R = r.
To explain better the behavior of wages under the assumption R = 1
β
, and in the case
where the participation constraints don’t bind I provide the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Assume that R = 1
β
and φ1t+1 = φ
2
t+1 = 0 for t = 0, 1, 2, ..... Let
t = 0 denote the initial period of the match. Analogously let wt be the wage rate offered
by the firm to the worker in t. It is possible to show that :
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i) Wages are constant for periods t = 1, 2, ..., i.e. wt = w (a constant) for all t ≥ 0
ii) The initial wage w0 could either satisfy w0 > w or w0 = w. In the latter case it
must be that w = y.
As mentioned previously i) follows from the fact that cet = c
e
t+1 under the optimal
contract. Then since the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption in employment and
unemployment is constant in t + 1 (as equation (10) shows), by the envelope condition
in the unemployed agent’s value function, it must be that assets are constant after t = 1.
This implies that the wages offered are also constant (from the budget constraint).
Part ii) of the proposition states that the initial wage could be of a larger value than
w. In fact by the property of stationarity of wages from t = 1 onwards it follows that
if w0 > w then w0 > y and w < y (otherwise profits would not be zero). Notice that
such a scheme does not violate the firm’s participation constraint. This holds since firms
make profits greater than zero after the initial period. Moreover, note that because of
the stationarity of assets, wages and consumption for t ≥ 1, a higher wage in period zero
leads to a larger wealth stock a1.
Could the initial wage be smaller than y thus leading to an extraction of the worker’s
wealth endowment? The answer is no. In such a case we can claim that the implied wage
profile is one that violates the firms participation constraint. Assume the converse: Let
the firm pay w0 < y in the initial period. Under zero initial profits it follows that the
firm must then offer w > y (i.e. wages greater than output in every subsequent period)
The firm earns a negative present value of profits from t = 1 onwards thus violating
participation.
The suggested wage profile in proposition 1 is feasible if we can show that there are
values of a1 such that the constraint W (a1, J1) > U(a1, 0) is slack. It is however very
difficult to provide general conditions for this to be the case, especially in light of the
nonlinearities involved. Obviously feasibility depends on the initial wealth endowment
of the agent and the overall environment, i.e. the shape of the payoff functions W (a, J)
and U(a, 0). It turns out that this is the case in the simulation results I provide below.
Moreover, in the next paragraph I provide analytical examples to support the argument.
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I now turn to the effect of the participation constraints on the consumption ratio
in equation (10). Assume that the firm needs to be made better off so that φ2t+1 > 0.
Then as (10) reveals if R = r, the worker maybe overinsured against the job separation as
consumption could rise if she becomes unemployed. In the more relevant case of R = 1
β
the
drop in consumption is less (the ratio
cet+1
cut+1
is smaller). The converse holds if φ1t+1 > 0. In
this case the worker needs to be made better off under the contract, and her consumption
drops when she becomes unemployed even if we assume R = r. Notice that this echoes
to the previous result that the worker is savings constrained in this case. The following
proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 2. Consider the unemployment insurance properties of the optimal
contract as shown in equation (10 ).
i) If χt = 0 and φ
1
t+1 = φ
2
t+1 = 0 and r = R then the worker is perfectly insured
against unemployment (in the sense that cut+1 = c
e
t+1 ). On the other hand with sufficient
discounting r < R = 1
β
the agent is underinsured almost everywhere on the optimal
contract (unless χt > 0 in which case it is impossible to sign the difference in marginal
utilities.)
ii) Under a binding participation constraint for the worker ( φ1t+1 > 0) the drop in
consumption in the event of separation is larger. Under a binding constraint for the firm,
the drop in consumption is less.
Proof: See text.
3.2.1 Two Analytical Examples
I derive here two examples, that illustrate the properties of the allocation under the
assumption r < R = 1
β
. Example 1 illustrates the properties of the optimal wage
schedule in closed form. Example 2 explains the decreasing consumption profile property
in the case where the firm’s participation constraint is binding.
Example 1: Unemployment as an absorbing state. For simplicity consider the
following version of the model: Assume that an employed individual faces a constant
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probability of unemployment λ each period but assume that when the separation shock
arrives the agent stays unemployed forever (hence v(s) = 0). Moreover, assume that
benefits are zero at all horizons and therefore taxes are also zero. For simplicity let r = 1.
Under these assumptions it is possible to derive the value function U(a, 0) as follows:
U(a, 0) =
log(a)
1− β +
log(1− β)
1− β + βlog(β) + 2β
2 log(β) + 3β3log(β) + .... =
=
log(a)
1− β +
log(1− β)
1− β + βlog(β)
1
(1− β)2(11)
Now consider the worker’s initial employment period with a value function W (a0, 0).
As described previously the worker must decide on an initial wage w0 and a constant wage
w, from period one onwards. Moreover, by the firm’s promise keeping constraint it must
be that w0 = y + (y − w) 1−λR−1+λ = y + (y − w). Letting the worker have initial assets of
a0, and a constant consumption of c
e during employment it must then be that:
a1 = a1 + w − ce → ce = w
a1 = a0 + w0 − ce = a0 + y + (y − w)− w = a0 + (y − w)(1 + )(12)
Finally, notice that since a1 is constant the worker’s value function satisfies: W (a0, 0) =
W (a1, J1). In particular it holds that:
W (a0, 0) =
1
1− β(1− λ)(log(w) + βλU(a1, 0))(13)
The first order condition that defines the optimum is given by: 1
w
= βλ 1
a1
1
1−β , which
yields that:
w = a0(1− β) + y 1− β
1 + βλ− β
Notice that w ≤ y if and only if the following condition is met:
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Condition 1. The firm’s participation constraint is slack if it holds that:
a0(1− β) ≤ y βλ
1 + βλ− β(14)
Intuitively Condition 1 states that if the worker has low initial wealth, she is under-
insured against unemployment. It is then optimal to borrow from the firm in period 0
and accumulate assets. If on the other hand a0 is high enough, then the difference in the
rates of return induce the agent to want save with the firm and enjoy higher wages and
consumption in the future. As the previous discussion indicated in this case it will be
that w0 = w = y (or the firm’s participation constraint will bind). I will later show that
this property also holds in the simulations of the model.
The allocation defined above is optimal if we can illustrate that the worker’s participa-
tion constraint is slack. Given the solution to the worker’s program we can demonstrate
that this is the case if it holds that:
W (a1, J1) > U(a1, 0) or
1
1− β(1− λ)(log(w) + βλU(a1, 0)) > U(a1, 0)(15)
Making use of the above formulas (15) becomes:
log(w)
1− β >
log(a0βλ(1 + ) + yβλ(1 + )
2)
1− β +
log(1− β)
1− β + βlog(β)
1
(1− β)2(16)
(16) then gives:
log(1− β)
1− β >
log(βλ(1 + ))
1− β +
log(1− β)
1− β + βlog(β)
1
(1− β)2
or
0 > log(
λ
1− β + βλ) + log(β)
1
(1− β)(17)
Note that the second term on the LHS in (17) is negative as β is less than one. Moreover,
the leading term is also negative if λ is less than one. Therefore the inequality in (17)
16
holds, proving that the allocation does not violate the worker’s participation constraint.
This provides an example of the wage scheme in proposition 1.
Example 2: Decreasing consumption under a binding participation con-
straint. Consider the model of example 1, however assume that λ = 0 (no separations).
In this case it is evident that the first order condition of the worker’s program derived
previously, does not have an interior solution. For a worker with wealth a0 at the initial
date of the match, the optimum is to set a1 = 0. The implied initial wage, w0, is below
productivity to finance a higher wage and consumption profile in the future. It must then
be that w > y thus violating the firm’s participation constraint. Under this condition
wages have to be equal to productivity in every period. The optimal consumption path
can be shown to satisfy the following equations:
1
cet
= β
1
cet+1
=
1
cet+1
− φ2t+1 if at+1 > 0(18)
1
cet
= β
1
cet+1
+ χt =
1
cet+1
− φ2t+1 + χt if at+1 = 0(19)
Notice that both (18) and (19) are consistent with equation (9) so long as φ1t+1 = 0. (18)
suggests that consumption is given by the standard Euler equation implying a decreasing
profile insofar as assets are greater than zero, and a constant consumption profile (obvi-
ously equal to y) if assets are at the zero bound. Therefore, under a binding participation
constraint and when assets are above the desired level (here zero) consumption is high
and decreasing over time, until the desired wealth level is hit.
We can derive the optimal path applying the following arguments: First, note that
insofar as wealth is positive, the worker’s budget constraint gives:
at+1 = at − cet + y = ... = ty + a0 −
t∑
j=0
cej = ty + a0 − ce0
t∑
j=0
βj(20)
where the last equality follows from (18). Second, assume that from t = 0 to some
t = T − 1 the optimal consumption path is indeed given by cet = βtce0 for some ce0. This
implies that ceT−1 = aT−1 + y and that aT = 0. Given this path and since consumption is
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given by y for any t ≥ T we can derive the worker’s lifetime utility as follows:
WT = I(T > 1)
T−2∑
t=0
βtlogβt(ce0) + β
T−1log(aT−1 + y) +
βT
1− β log(y)
or making use of the formulas above and rearranging:
WT = I(T > 1)(1− β
T−1
1− β log(c
e
0) +
β
1− β log(β)(
1− βT−2
1− β − (T − 2)β
T−1))
+βT−1log(a0 + Ty − 1− β
T−1
1− β c
e
0) +
βT
1− β log(y)(21)
Notice that the optimal allocation is one that maximizes (21) with respect to T and ce0
subject to at ≥ 0 for t = 1, 2, ...T − 1 and subject to aT = a0 + Ty − 1−βt1−β c0 ≥ 0. The
problem is then trivial since when T is constrained to be an integer, the constraints at ≥ 0
are violated for any T other than the optimal one. For example, assume a0 <
1−β
β
y.
It is then evident that setting T = 2 would violate the asset bound as in this case
a1 = y + a0 − c0 = a0 + y − 2y+a01+β < 0. Moreover, we can establish that:
W1 = log(a0 + y) +
β
1− β log(y) > W2 = (1 + β)log((a0 + 2y)) + βlog(β) +
β2
1− β log(y)
whenever a0 <
1−β
β
y. Similarly W2 > W3 when a0 <
1+β−2β2
β2
y and so on.
One final comment is in order: Note that example 2 applies also to the case where
λ > 0. The difference is that the optimal stationary asset level is then positive and equal
to y βλ
(1+βλ−β)(1−β) , as the previous results indicate.
4 If the worker starts the job with
assets above the that level, the firm’s participation constraint binds, assets are gradually
run down and consumption falls over time.
4When λ > 0 the drop of consumption will be slower than at rate β because it is optimal to hold
assets for self insurance purposes. The Euler equation will then contain an additional term, the marginal
utility of consumption in unemployment, (see the derivations in example 1).
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3.2.2 Optimal Compensation
Figure 1 illustrates the wage profile of the employed agent as a function of her initial
wealth, under the baseline version of the model (see section 4 for details on the parameter
values). The top left panel plots the wage in the first period of the match. The bottom
panel represents the analogous wage schedule in period two and every other period.
Consistent with previous theoretical results, the baseline model produces a region
where individuals take an upfront payment (higher wages in the first period) which helps
to build a stock of assets. In the second period, wages drop permanently so that firms
make positive profits in the match. At higher (initial) wealth, the allocation is such
that the firm’s participation constraint binds, and wages are equal to y = 1 throughout.
Morever, since it is assumed that R = 1
β
, the optimal consumption path stays constant
and the optimal allocation features stationarity, after the initial period, meaning that
wealth and the level of utility are also constant. This stationary region in the figure,
corresponds to any value of assets that gives an initial wage greater than one. Conversely,
if a worker starts at a very high level of wealth, the firm’s participation constraint binds
and consumption drops overtime. The allocation will then (gradually) converge to the
lowest wealth level such that w0 = y (around 0.8 in terms of asset income).
[ Figure 1 About Here ]
3.2.3 Why the worker’s participation constraint is slack
Under the assumption R = 1
β
> r the model doesn’t give a region where the worker’s
participation binds. This was also shown to be the case previously under examples 1 and 2.
5 To better understand this feature of the model, assume that instead we had R = r. As
established previously in this case the worker’s consumption drops over time, and if it were
not for the explicit participation constraint, the marginal utility would tend to infinity
(consumption would tend to zero). Under the limited commitment contract, however,
such paths can be ruled out since at or beyond the borrowing limit, the worker becomes
5For example 1 this property was established. For example 2 it follows from the fact that the firm’s
constraint binds and the worker’s constraint cannot bind since the match surplus is strictly positive.
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eventually better off in unemployment (at least if government benefits are positive). 6
In this model the stationary point of the allocation, is where the worker’s participation
constraint binds. To put this differently the worker’s constraint is particularly relevant
when R = r but not when R = 1
β
> r as I have assumed.
3.3 Comparison with flat wage contracts
I have thus far illustrated that the optimal contract under the assumption R = 1
β
, is
such that firms frontload wages to encourage asset accumulation, and that provided the
participation constraints are slack, consumption and wealth are constant, for a long as the
job lasts. Employed individuals therefore, accumulate assets up to the stationary point,
which is reached in one period. Individuals that lose their job but are lucky not to suffer
from a prolonged unemployment spell will eventually have higher wealth, since assets are
run down in unemployment.
These properties can be contrasted to the typical shape of private consumption and
wealth accumulation during employment, in models of heterogeneous agents without op-
timal contracts (for example Wang and Williamson (2002)). Since in these models, the
labor income is higher in employment (assuming that the wage is equal to y each pe-
riod), workers accumulate wealth over time and consumption grows during employment.
This occurs until a buffer stock of assets is built and then consumption remains con-
stant. Therefore, in contrast to the optimal allocation, under a flat contract it may take
considerable time to build that buffer stock.
To clarify this intuition it is useful to first consider the derivations of examples 1
and 2 from the previous subsection. Note that in example 1 it was established that
insofar as the the firms participation constraint is slack (i.e. at an initial wealth level
a0 ≤ a˜ = y βλ(1+βλ−β)(1−β) the optimal policy was to have: a1 = a0 βλ1+βλ−β + y βλ(1+βλ−β)2 .
When the firm’s constraint was binding (i.e. when a0 > a˜) it was optimal to decrease
assets up to the point a˜. One can arguably make the case that for any initial wealth level
exceeding this threshold, the optimal contract gives a solution identical to the standard
6The borrowing constraint precludes to have marginal utility in unemployment tending to infinity (eg.
assets tend to a natural borrowing limit of minus the present value of unemployment benefits).
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of heterogeneous agents model i.e. a solution to the following program:
W(a0) = max
a1≥0
log(−a1 + a0 + y) + β(1− λ)W(a1) + βλU(a1, 0)(22)
where U(a1, 0) is given by (11). Under the previous results it holds that: W (a0, 0) =
W(a0) if a0 ≥ a, but also that W (a0, 0) ≥ W(a0) if a0 ≤ a. 7
In figure 2 I illustrate the wealth accumulation paths under the baseline calibration of
the model. The solid line corresponds to the optimal contract, the crossed line shows asset
growth for the flat contract and the dashed line is at 45 degrees. Notice that in contrast to
the case of example 1, the stationary wealth levels are different between the two allocations
and also the rate of asset de-cumulation is different. This property derives from the fact
that in the baseline model the shape of the unemployment payoff function is not identical
in the two models, since the analogous value functions for employed individuals also differ.
In example 1 I had assumed that the lifetime utility of unemployment is given, by making
unemployment an absorbing state. In the baseline model this property obviously does
not hold.
[ Figure 2 About Here ]
There are several noteworthy features: First, notice that where asset growth is positive,
a newly employed agent experiences considerably stronger wealth growth over the first
period, under the optimal contract. For instance, if the worker starts the job with zero
wealth after one period, her wealth endowment increases to roughly 0.47. If she starts
with assets of 0.2, her wealth goes to 0.5. The analogous figures for asset accumulation
are substantially smaller in the case of the flat contract. From zero initial wealth, next
period’s wealth is roughly at 0.08. Second, note that since wealth accumulation under
the optimal contract takes place in the first period of the match, eventually the wealth
level could be greater under a flat wage contract. This is so in the case of zero initial
assets: The optimal contract delivers 0.47 whereas the stationary wealth level for the flat
contract is 0.62. Obviously this does not hold when initial wealth is high.
7This follows from the fact that a flat wage contract is Pareto dominated by the optimal allocation.
Note that under both arrangements firms make zero profits but the worker optimizes in W (a0, 0).
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These properties are useful to think about the steady state distribution of assets in
the two cases. Under the optimal allocation, for employed individuals the stationary
distribution will be concentrated in points above 0.47 whereas under the standard model
of heterogeneous agents, for some individuals wealth levels could be considerably low.
Moreover, under the optimal contract individuals are obviously much better placed to
deal with early separation shocks, whereas if wages are flat, it will take several periods
until a buffer stock of assets is built.
To further illustrate this point, but also to illustrate the scope of (private) insurance
through wealth in the two models in figure 3, I show the consumption ratio
cut+1
cet+1
as a
function of the individuals initial wealth endowment. Under the solid line I represent
the optimal contract. Under the dashed line the flat contract. Moreover, the top panel
shows the consumption ratios, when the worker loses her job after one period, and the
bottom panel shows the expected consumption loss, that is the weighted average of the
events that the match survives for x periods, weighted by the probability of duration x.
As the results suggest the optimal contract provides considerably more insurance (under
the baseline calibration) over all wealth levels and across both horizons. 8
4 Numerical Analysis
4.1 Calibration
I briefly explain the choice of parameters and functional forms.
Following Wang and Williamson (2002) I assume that the search function is of the
following form: γ(s) = 1 − e(−γs), where γ is a constant. The cost of search is given by
v(s) = sδ. I set δ = 2 (quadratic cost).
In order to pin down the separation rate λ I assume as in the search and matching
literature that over a monthly horizon workers face a probability of 2.5% of losing their
job. Since one period in the model corresponds to one quarter, I have to recover from this
assumption the quarterly value for λ. To accomplish this I assume that the stationary
8Notice that if initial wealth is high, the consumption loss could increase over time if the worker runs
down her stock of assets. This is typically the case in the upper part of the wealth grid.
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unemployment rate is 6.2 % (average in the CPS over the years 1994-2011). This gives me
a value for the monthly job finding probability of 0.3782 (denote this by γmonthly). Then
the number of unemployed individuals that have a duration of up to one quarter is given
by (1 − u)λmonthly(1 + 1 − γmonthly + (1 − γmonthly)2). This gives a (quarterly) value for
λ equal to λmonthly(1 + 1− γmonthly + (1− γmonthly)2) since the stationary unemployment
rate is the same at both horizons. The corresponding value is 0.0503. Moreover, I set γ
so that the model produces an unemployment rate of 6.2%. This gives a value of 2.54 for
γ.
The baseline unemployment benefit scheme is such that each agent earns 50 % of
gross income for the first two quarters in unemployment and zero afterwards. Formally
bj = .5y For j = 0, 1 and bj = 0 For j ≥ 2. 9 I normalize the value of y to unity.
Finally, I calibrate the discount rates and the market interest rates as follows: I choose
a value for r equal to one as Wang and Williamson (2002) do. This practically means that
workers have access to a storage technology, and they earn zero return on their savings.
For parameters R and β, which given r govern consumption loses in unemployment, I
target values so that the model yields an average (over an annual horizon) consumption
loss suffered by workers that experience an unemployment spell of 6.8% consistent with
the empirical evidence in Gruber (1997). This procedure gives β = 0.990675. Then R = 1
β
is roughly equal to 1.00941.
4.2 Optimal Unemployment Benefit Scheme
This section turns to the evaluation of the optimal unemployment benefit scheme. I
assume that the government implements a change in policy, and offers a different UI
schedule than the baseline. The government takes private behavior as given and therefore
it does not exert direct control over the risk sharing arrangement between workers and
firms. To characterize the optimal policy I focus on the steady steady outcome. Therefore
the evaluation of the optimal policy is made, assuming that the economy has settled to
9Note that this corresponds to the current policy in most states in the US, assuming that benefits
are not extended as usual in periods of ”high unemployment”. Since my target rate of unemployment is
6.2% the baseline benefit scheme is realistic.
23
the new steady state distribution.
Moreover, I consider a restricted class of UI schemes here, and in particular schemes
that give out different levels of unemployment benefits over two time intervals: the gov-
ernment pays out b≤m for any duration smaller that m, and it pays b>m for durations
exceeding m. One example of such a policy, is the current UI benefit schedule in the
US that pays a constant replacement ratio for up to two quarters, and no benefits subse-
quently (hence b≤1 = b and b>1 = 0). I maximize welfare over b≤m and b>m considering
cases where where m is either 0 or 1 that is benefits are given for either one or two
quarters. 10 I restrict the analysis along these lines for two reasons: First, because it is
computationally very difficult to consider policies that optimize benefits over many dif-
ferent time intervals. Second, because in the model most unemployment spells end after
two quarters. Therefore extending to consider a more complex benefit scheme would not
affect my conclusions.
In table 1 I report the results from various UI schemes. ”Zero benefits” sets the levels
of both b≤m and b>m equal to zero. ”Optimal Timing” shows the outcome from maximiz-
ing welfare over b≤m and b>m. The welfare effects reported in the second column of the
table, are shown relative to the baseline scheme and are stated in terms of the compensat-
ing variation (hereafter CV): Practically this measures how much more consumption (in
percentage terms) individuals require in the original steady state to be as well off as under
the new UI scheme. 11 For each of the policies considered columns three and four report
percentage changes in the unemployment rate and the required tax revenue to balance
the budget.
10As previously the m denotes the number of periods in unemployment prior to the current quarter.
Therefore, m = 0 corresponds to a newly unemployed individual.
11To evaluate the welfare effects of different policies I assume that the social planner assigns equal
weight to all agents in the economy. The welfare criterion is of the form:
Θ =
∫
W (a, J) d µe,a,J +
∑
j
∫
U(a, j)d µu,a,j
I convert the welfare numbers in terms of percentage consumption using the following calculation:
Θ1 = Θ0 +
1
1− β log(1 + )
Where Θ0 is the expected utility in the baseline regime and Θ1 is the analogous object under a different
policy regime. The fraction  is therefore the standard measure of compensated variation.
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Within the class of UI policies considered, the optimal scheme is one that pays for the
first quarter of unemployment, benefits equal to 1.165 and subsequently (for all durations
greater than a quarter) it pays 0.40. According to the results in the table under this
policy there is a welfare gain of 0.75% in terms of CV. Other policies considered may also
improve considerably on the baseline UI scheme, however, the welfare gains are smaller.
For instance an ”Optimal Timing” which sets m = 1 (i.e. chooses benefits optimally for
two quarters and separately for longer durations) gives a gain of 0.50%. Moreover, setting
optimal benefits for the first m quarters, but subsequently restricting benefits to zero (last
two rows of the table) also does better than the baseline and delivers similar gains for
m = 0, 1.
4.2.1 Understanding the result
These patterns can be explained using the results of previous sections. An important
implication of the analysis, was that the scope of insurance is maximized when the firms
participation constraint binds. It was in that region that assets were beyond the desired
stationary point (the buffer stock level) and consumption declined over time. If the worker
lost her job, the drop in consumption relative to employment was less, because savings
were effective in mitigating the risk of unemployment. Moreover, these properties were
common with the model of heterogeneous agents; in fact the optimal allocation was to
offer a wage equal to y (flat contract) in that region.
Given these remarks we anticipate that the government would have an implicit in-
centive to maximize the frequency with which the firms’ participation constraints bind
over the stationary distribution. Figure 4 shows on the left panel the wage profile under
the optimal UI scheme, and on the right, the stationary wealth distribution of employed
individuals. Notice that the optimal contract is effectively a flat wage contract: the entire
distribution falls in the region where a wage equal to y is offered to the worker in all
periods. Therefore, under the optimal policy the firms participation constraint is tight
independent of the initial wealth endowment of the worker.
Frontloading UI payments accomplishes to tighten the firm’s constraint for two rea-
sons: First, benefits that exceed y in the first period of unemployment but fall rapidly for
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the remaining periods of a spell, induce individuals to save. This effectively means that
a considerable fraction of workers who manage to find jobs after one quarter, will start
their matches with wealth above the stationary point. This effect operates through the
ergodic distribution.
To further explain this point, assume that unemployment benefits were equal to zero
at all horizons. In the simulations such as scheme implies that over the entire ergodic
distribution the optimal contract is one that offers a frontloaded wage and a constant
consumption path over time (i.e. the constraint is slack everywhere). Workers accumulate
assets when the match formulates, through the wage schedule properties, but when the
unemployment shock arrives they run them down. Over the stationary distribution there
is no one with wealth at or above the buffer stock level. The opposite holds under the
suggested UI scheme. Individuals save in unemployment and a large fraction find new
jobs with high wealth.
The second reason for why the frontloaded UI scheme is most effective in tightening the
firms constraint is that in the model, wealth is the vehicle via which firms can contract
on the worker’s value in unemployment, and control their consumption in that state.
However, since the agent is effectively beyond the reach of the firm when she becomes
unemployed, it is only consumption in the first period that may be influenced, or the
payoff U(a, 0). Frontloading benefits reduces the value of wealth in U(a, 0) but not in
U(a, 1), U(a, 2) and so on. Therefore the optimal investment in wealth is less under this
policy.
The combined effect of these channels, is important to get the results in figure 4. To
illustrate this point in figure 5 I show the wage profile and the stationary distribution in
the case where UI payments are received only in the first quarter of unemployment and
subsequently they are set to zero (second to last column in table 1). Notice that in this
case in the stationary distribution there is still a considerable mass of individuals whose
wealth level is below the buffer stock level. This is so because individuals reduce their
savings very rapidly, if their spell lasts for longer than one quarter. The welfare gains
implied are smaller than under the optimal policy, as unemployment benefits extended to
longer durations are particularly useful in mitigating the risk from prolonged spells.
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Finally, note that policies setting benefits optimally for the first two quarters (i.e.
m = 1 in the table) do not induce individuals to save sufficiently in quarter one. In effect
these schemes produce very few individuals with sufficient wealth to reach the point where
the firm’s participation constraint is binding. This also reduces the welfare gains from
UI.
4.3 Benefits under flat wage contracts
The previous paragraph showed that the optimal UI scheme is frontloaded and effectively
one that makes the optimal contract offered to all workers, a flat wage contract. Moreover,
the analysis of section 3 demonstrated that when the firm pays a constant wage the
allocation is essentially equivalent to the model of heterogeneous households, when the
value function of the unemployed agent is common in the two models. This property
holds in the steady state, under the optimal policy.
In now turn to the properties of the optimal UI scheme under heterogeneous house-
holds. I establish that the optimal policy is the very one that maximizes welfare in the
optimal contract economy. The results are shown in table 2. Notice that under ”Optimal
Timing” with m = 1, the target benefit levels b≤m and b>m, are identical to the previous
case of the optimal contract. Moreover, this policy of frontloading benefits in the first
quarter of the unemployment spell delivers the highest welfare gains. 12
Notice that obtaining the same benefit schedule in the two models is far from being
an obvious result. To put this differently though the allocation is equivalent under the
optimal policy (or in a region close to it) the outcomes can differ substantially away from
the optimal benefit scheme. Therefore it is necessary to explain why in the heterogeneous
agent model the planner wants to frontload benefits.
The crucial observation is that the government wishing to provide insurance against
unemployment is generally better placed to do so if it utilizes state contingent benefits,
12Notice that the welfare gains across all schemes are more modest now than under the optimal contract
economy. The reason is that in the benchmark economy, in the case of the heterogeneous household model,
aggregate unemployment is slightly less than 6.2% and therefore taxes are also smaller. I however have
chosen not to adjust the value of γ, in order to keep the optimal policy implications comparable across
the two models.
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rather than non contingent assets. For example, in the case where benefits are set equal to
zero workers have a stronger incentive to save. But as savings are not particularly useful
in insuring consumption against early separation shocks (this case was made previously
in comparison to the optimal contract model), consumption loses for a fraction of indi-
viduals may be considerably large. In contrast, unemployment benefits can provide an
insulation of the worker’s consumption, since unemployment income is given contingent
on a separation.
Note that under the optimal UI scheme the stationary (buffer stock) wealth level is
effectively zero. Workers that begin their job with an asset level exceeding zero are effec-
tively insured sufficiently against unemployment and run down their wealth endowment
over time. The model, therefore, implies that the cost of accumulating precautionary
savings during employment (in terms of consumption smoothing) is greater than the cost
of higher taxes during employment which are required to finance higher benefits.
Finally, in figure 6 I show the optimal consumption schedules as a function of assets
and at the optimal policy. For the sake of clarity I have included one curve which now
represents both the optimal contract economy and the heterogeneous household model.
Note that there is considerably more insurance now than in the benchmark UI scheme
in both cases. However it is still not optimal to insure the worker perfectly against
unemployment in the initial period of her spell. The intuition is that partial insurance is
optimal in the presence of moral hazard concerns.
5 Discussion and Extensions
In this section I discuss the assumptions of the model with particular focus on the role
of relative discounting and the zero profit condition imposed on firms at the start of each
match. Moreover, I present two extensions: One applies the analysis to the economic
environment of the directed search equilibrium of Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999), whereas the second derives the implications for the optimal contract assuming that
firms and workers bargain over the allocation in each period. I consider how the main
take away of the paper about the role of public policy is impacted by these considerations.
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Finally, I explicitly address whether the model presented in this paper is empirically
relevant. The discussion is based on the analysis presented in Oikonomou (2010, Ch. 1
and 2).
5.1 Discount Rates and General Equilibrium
As discussed in the previous sections, the relative discount factors of firms and workers
bear important implications for the optimal allocation. The main results of the paper
derive under the assumption that R = 1
β
> r which as the analysis of section 3 has
demonstrated, limits the scope of private insurance against unemployment. If I had
assumed R = r instead, then the optimal allocation would feature complete insurance
over part of the state space, but also a decreasing profile of consumption for the worker.
So long as the match survives for a long period, the stationary point of the allocation is
reached when the worker becomes indifferent between employment and unemployment.
Therefore, the participation constraint, which is crucial in equilibrium in this model, is
on the worker’s side, rather than on the firm’s side. As equation (10) suggests when
the worker’s participation constraint binds, it is likely that there is underinvestment in
wealth.
A completely different set of results could arise in this type of environment as the
government is concerned to drive the allocation away from that point. In Oikonomou
(2010, Ch 2) I found that contrary to the optimal policy in this paper, it is optimal to
backload unemployment benefits. In fact a scheme that sets benefits equal to zero for
the first or first two quarters of an unemployment spell, delivers the largest welfare gains.
Through such a policy the government effectively accomplishes to not crowd out private
risk sharing. It therefore seems that in terms of the limited commitment model and its
implications the crucial feature is which of the two participation constraints is particularly
relevant.
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5.1.1 General Equilibrium
Assuming a production technology without capital in this paper, enabled me to fix the rate
of return r. Instead, if I had assumed, that aggregate worker savings form the economy’s
capital stock, then varying the UI scheme would have an effect on the interest rate r and
thus on the optimal allocation.
There is a particular concern related to the presence of general equilibrium effects in
the model: Reductions in wealth, driven by higher unemployment benefits would lead to
increases in the rate of return r. Even though the property R = 1
β
> r would hold, the
distance between R and r would be less. This could in principle lead to a wider range
over which the firm’s participation constraint is non binding. 13
If this effect is overwhelming it could imply that no policy is able to deliver the pre-
diction that the wage schedule is equal to y in every period, and therefore the equivalence
of the optimal contract model, with the heterogeneous household model. Moreover, as
highlighted by Young (2004), when general equilibrium effects are accounted for, typically
they are powerful enough to make optimal a benefit level equal to zero at all horizons. It
is certainly interesting to extend the analysis presented here to this case. However, it is
also important to point out that not accounting for general equilibrium considerations, is
typical in models which consider the effect of individual savings on UI (see for example
Shimer and Werning (2008) and Werning (2002) among others). Therefore, though en-
dogenizing interest rates is a valid extension of the model, the assumption made here is
common in much of the related literature.
5.2 Directed Search
One of the important assumptions made in this paper, is that at the start of the match,
the firm earns zero profits in expectation. This assumption was motivated by the fact that
search costs were entirely borne by the agents in the model. Thus the paper describes
the effects of policy focusing on the supply side of the labor market. I briefly discuss the
13 The argument could be traced to the previous analysis, showing that the firm’s constraint binds
when the optimal contract calls for an initial wage below productivity (and an extraction of the wealth
of the worker). Since higher values of r reduce the difference between R and r, the incentive to save with
the firm is weaker.
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implications of assuming that matching costs are borne by firms, suggesting to extend
the directed search model of Moen (1996), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Rudanko
(2009, 2011) to the optimal contract with worker savings presented here. The economic
environment is the following: Each firm in the economy offers a different wage level, which
is assumed to be constant throughout the life of the match. The different wage levels form
different segments in the labor market and agents channel their search to the segment that
offers the highest payoff in terms of wages and the duration of unemployment. Higher
wages attract more unemployed individuals and fewer firms and therefore are associated
with longer durations.
The framework of optimal contracts presented in this paper can be embedded in the
directed search equilibrium, replacing the flat wage with an optimal contract. 14 In
Oikonomou (2010, Ch 1), following the work of Rudanko (2009, 2011) I describe the
equilibrium where firms post a present value J0, which is a sufficient statistic for the
optimal allocation. Workers of lower wealth then choose a higher value of J0, since
typically poorer individuals prefer to get a job offer fast, rather than wait for higher
wages. If in this model we assume R = 1
β
> r, there is the following implications: Because
jobs start at J0 > 0 (otherwise firms would not bear the vacancy costs) it is possible to
see firms offering very low wages initially, consistent with an asset extraction (see section
3), and without violating their participation constraints. This may give a different role
to government provided unemployment insurance but also give a richer pattern of wages
at the cross-section (most notably in some cases workers will experience positive wage
growth). This is therefore an extension of the model worthy of considering in future
work.
5.3 Are Frontloaded Wage Profiles Reasonable?
One of the main goals of this paper was to extend limited commitment model of wages,
to allow for savings. The key prediction is that when wealth can be utilized to insure the
worker against the risk of unemployment, the implied wage profile may be frontloaded,
14Rudanko (2009, 2011) was the first to incorporate the limited commitment model without savings,
in the directed search equilibrium.
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meaning that the firm gives a loan to the worker.
At a first glance the frontloaded wage property seems to predict that wages drop over
the life of the match. However the model could be extended to produce a rising wage
profile, if we postulate that the match productivity increases over time. Therefore the
correct interpretation of the wage schedule is rather that wages rise at a slower pace than
productivity. If productivity is steeply rising, the worker would like to borrow from the
firm for consumption smoothing purposes, in the same sense that high initial wages help
to mitigate the risk of unemployment in the model. These implications seem reasonable
when matched against the wages of young individuals which are relatively flat in the data,
even though initial productivity is typically low in part due to training and human capital
accumulation. 15
5.3.1 Decentralizing through severance payments
A further reason for which the implications of the limited commitment model with sav-
ings are empirically relevant, is that the allocation under certain conditions, can be shown
equivalent to a flat wage schedule with a severance payment upon separation. 16 This
holds in the model when R = r but not more generally when R > r. To see this let
severance payments be denoted by ξ. Moreover, assume for the moment that the par-
ticipation constraints for the firm and the worker can be ignored. The optimal allocation
then solves the following functional equation:
W (a, J) = max
a′,J ′,ξ
log(−a′ + ra− τ − J + y + 1− λ
R
J ′ − λξ
R
)(23)
+ β(λU(a′ +
ξ
R
, 0) + (1− λ)W (a′, J ′))(24)
15It is important to stress that the usual contractual considerations put forward by the personnel
economics literature (see for example Hutchens (1989)) and which make productivity rise faster than
wages are missing from the model. The focus here is on one particular aspect of the wage setting process,
but the results should not be misconstrued to mean that other considerations are not important.
16Insurance against unemployment through severance compensation is rather common in the US data
(see Pissarides (2004) and Chetty (2008)).
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Subject to the constraint set:
a′ ≥ a a′ + ξ
R
≥ a
Note that in (24) the promise keeping constraint (which holds as an equality) is given
by: J = y − w + 1−λ
R
J ′ − λ
R
ξ. In the event of a separation the firm pays to the worker
income equal to ξ.17 Moreover, note that after replacing consumption with the promise
keeping and budget constraints in (24) what remains in the constraint set is the boundary
conditions a′ ≥ a and a′ + ξ
R
≥ a. The latter requires that total assets in the event of
separation to not violate the borrowing limit. To show that program (24) is the same as
program (2) consider the following Ricardian equivalence argument: Increase wealth for
the worker by ξ
R
today and let the new level of assets be a˜′ = a′ + ξ
R
. Also increase
the continuation (promised) utility J ′ by ξ and define J˜ ′ = J ′ + ξ. Then clearly
W (a˜′, J˜ ′) = W (a′, J ′) since the amount of resources available to finance consumption for
the worker next period is unchanged. Thus a program that sets ξ = 0 and uses next
period’s wealth as a single control variable as in equation (2) is payoff equivalent to one
where both investment in wealth and severance payments are allowed.
Under limited commitment matters are more complicated but we can always construct
examples where the constraint set is such that allowing for severance payments makes no
difference for the optimal allocation. Most notably this requires to assume that severance
payments are fully enforceable, but also that the worker’s outside option is such that
she always gets ξ when the match is destroyed. (i.e U(a′ + ξ
R
, 0)). Note, however, that
the result above is nevertheless pertinent for the limited commitment contract, for the
following reason: Under R = r and full commitment the resulting wage profile will be
even more frontloaded leading to a full insulation of the worker’s consumption against
unemployment. Therefore wage paths which are even more volatile than the analogous
paths derived in this paper, are empirically relevant, if the frontloaded wage profile is
interpreted as severance compensation. A similar argument can be made for the case
17Note that if the firm pays ξ to the worker in the event of a separation the workers wealth is equal to
ra+ ξ and not a+ ξ given the market structure assumed. Therefore utility in the state of unemployment
is U(a′ + ξR , 0) as suggested by equation (24).
33
R > r where severance payments only provide partial insurance against unemployment,
reflecting the previous results of section 3. In this case the limited commitment coupled
with the difference in the rates of return, also give less volatile wages.
5.4 Nash Bargaining
The baseline model of section 2 assumed that the firm and the worker could commit
to a given set of policies without ever renegotiating the optimal allocation. Though
the worker’s program was represented recursively, the allocation may be equivalently
described as an optimization at date 0, deriving a policy rule for every future period in
which the match survives. Renegotiating this rule is not feasible; implicitly commitment
is sustained by the threat of mutual reversion to autarky. This paragraph illustrates that
the framework presented in this paper, and the recursive representation of the problem,
can be extended to include renegotiation and bargaining between workers and firms in
every period. I focus here on Nash Bargaining following the bulk of the literature of search
theoretic models.
Before proceeding it is useful to consider a case in which the allocation described
in sections 2 and 3 presents an opportunity to the worker to renegotiate. In particular
consider where the frontloaded wage property. It was argued that after the first period,
wages were constant and equal to some level w < y. Note that in this case the worker
would benefit from having a higher wage wt > w in every t > 0 period with wt < y. The
firm would have no incentive to destroy the match since the present value of profits is
still positive, and the initial investment in the worker’s assets is sunk. This example also
gives an illustration for why the type of allocation presented in this section will rule out
frontloaded wages. The equilibrium that arises is one were wages, and payoffs, depend on
wealth as the only state variable.
Let the equilibrium, under bargaining give rise payoffs Ω(a) and Φ(a) to the worker
and the firm respectively. In order to uncover Ω(a) and Φ(a) I consider a representation
of the program as the (dual) problem of maximizing the firm’s profit function (see section
7.2 in the appendix). Moreover, I impose that the continuation policies are consistent
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with the equilibrium under Nash Bargaining. The program maybe written as follows:
Π(W,a) = max y − w + 1− λ
R
Φ(a′)(25)
subject to:
W ≤ u(−a
′
r
+ w − τ + a) + β((1− λ)Ω(a′) + λU(a′, 0))(26)
Ω(a) ∈ argmax
W
(W − U(a, 0))η(Π(W,a))1−η(27)
Φ(a) = Π(Ω(a), a)(28)
The parameter η determines the share of the surplus that accrues to the worker. Note
that equation (26) is the analogous object to the promise keeping constraint considered
in text. It requires that at least a level of lifetime utility W be delivered to the worker
although in this case the continuation utility must be consistent with the equilibrium
payoff Ω(a′). The firms profit is defined in (28) imposing that W = Ω(a).
This type of contract does not appear new in the literature. In fact Krusell et al (2010)
construct a model with search frictions in the labour market and incomplete insurance,
assuming that rents are bargained for each period with a Nash protocol. However, their
approach is different from mine; they approximate the Nash sharing rule with an invariant
function w(a) and solve the workers value function. Instead I treat allocations as part
of a more general contracting problem offering the possibility of incorporating additional
features to the model, such as considering separations endogenously determined by the
worker’s effort (see Wang and Williamson (2002) and Oikonomou (2010, Ch. 2)).
It can be shown that optimal choices of w and a′ satisfy the following first order
conditions:
κtu
′(cet ) = 1(29)
κtβ(λUat+1 + (1− λ)Ωat+1)−
1
r
+
1− λ
R
(1− κt+1Ωat+1) ≤ 0(30)
with strict equality if at+1 > 0. κt represents the multiplier on the promise keeping
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constraint. The envelope condition is given by: Φat = 1 − κtΩat . These equations have
the following interpretation: An increment is wealth in equation (30) has two distinct
effects on the firms profits: it lowers required wages to finance a given consumption
stream, but also increases the level of promised utility that the firm must deliver to the
worker (according to the derivative Ωat+1). The latter effect would tend to dominate the
closer the wealth is to the borrowing constraint since it is precisely there that an increment
in assets encounters the highest marginal utility gains. Rearranging (30) and making use
of the envelope conditions we get the following Euler condition for the model with Nash
Bargaining:
u′(cet ) ≥ βr(λUat+1 + (1− λ)Ωat+1) +
1− λ
R
r
κt
Φat+1(31)
Equation (31) sets the marginal cost of saving an extra unit today, equal to the future
marginal benefit, and an extra term that pertains to the shape of the profit function.
Should Φat+1 be less than zero, the marginal cost would be less than the marginal benefit
and the agent would be savings constrained. The converse holds if Φat+1 > 0.
It is perhaps more relevant to consider cases where the derivative Φat+1 is less than
zero. This is a common property of the numerical solutions to this model (see Krusell et
al (2010) and Oikonomou (2010 , Ch 1)). In such a case we can show from the Nash rule
that Ωat+1−Uat+1 < 0 (i.e. the marginal increment from an extra unit of wealth is higher
for an unemployed that for an employed agent). Rearranging (30) we get:
κt+1Ωat+1 = 1 +
κtR
r(1− λ)βr(λUat+1 + (1− λ)Ωat+1 − u
′(cet )) < κt+1Uat+1(32)
Equation (32) gives the underinsurance result for Nash Bargaining contracts. Whenever
Φat+1 < 0 the term in the parenthesis is positive and consumption falls as the agent
becomes unemployed. If on the other hand Φat+1 > 0 underinsurance is impossible to
prove.
Consider now the case where η = 1. The worker gets the entire surplus as we have
assumed in text. It is possible to argue that the Nash bargaining contract described above
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is a flat wage contract that sets wages equal to productivity each period. Assume the
contrary: Let wages be frontloaded (i.e. y < w0 initially) so that the worker receives
a loan that finances wealth accumulation. Assume without loss of generality that the
choice of assets is a1. The firms payoff is then Φ(a1). It must be that Φ(a1) = 0
since under η = 1 firms break even under the rebargained allocation. However note that
the equilibrium payoff satisfies Φ(a0) = y − w0 + 1−λR Φ(a1) < 0. Note that this is a
contradiction since the equilibrium payoff must also satisfy Φ(a0) = 0.
Result 1. In an equilibrium under Nash Bargaining with η = 1 the only incentive
compatible allocation has wages equal to productivity each period (flat wage contract).
The above result states that it is not possible to get a higher wage initially, as was
the case under the limited commitment contract. As explained previously under Nash
bargaining, the worker cannot commit to a lower wage w in every subsequent period.
6 Conclusions
This paper studies the optimal provision of unemployment benefits, in an economy with
private risk sharing. In particular firms offer to their workforce a contract subject to
limited commitment. It is shown that when workers have access to a storage technology,
savings are utilized to provide (partial) insurance against the risk of a job separation.
The participation constraints implied by limited commitment influence the scope of risk
sharing.
In this environment the government has the explicit goal to drive the allocation to
the point where the scope of private risk sharing is maximized. I illustrate that this
corresponds to the point where the firm’s participation constraint binds. The implied
optimal UI scheme entails large and frontloaded benefits. Moreover, under the optimal
public policy the allocation becomes identical to the model of heterogeneous households,
whereby assets are utilized for self insurance purposes.
On the methodological side this paper is the first to introduce savings in a limited
commitment model within the labor market context. I characterize analytically the opti-
mal behavior offering a comparison with the standard model of heterogeneous households.
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Finally, a number of interesting extensions that illustrate the general applicability of the
framework utilized, are provided.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Derivations in the Model of Section 3
The first order conditions from (2) are given by the following equations:
−u′(c) + βλUa′(a′, 0) + β(1− λ)Wa′(a′, J ′) + φ1(Wa′(a′, J ′)− Ua′(a′, 0)) + χ = 0
u′(c)
(1− λ)
R
+ β(1− λ)WJ ′(a′, J ′) + φ1WJ ′(a′, J ′) + φ2 = 0
Wa(a
′, J ′) = ru′(c) and WJ(a′, J ′) = −u′(c)
where u′ denotes the worker’s marginal utility, Wx is the partial derivative of W with
respect to argument x, φ1 and φ2 are the multipliers on the participation constraints for
the worker and the firm respectively, and χ is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint.
To derive equations (9) and (8) let cet denote the consumption of the employed agent
in t and cut the analogous object for the unemployed agent (in the first period of unem-
ployment). Notice also that the partial derivative value function of the unemployed with
respect to wealth is given by Ua(a, 0) = ru
′(cut ) by the standard envelope condition. With
the appropriate substitutions we have:
u′(cet ) = βλru
′(cut+1) + β(1− λ)ru′(cet+1) + φ1t+1r(u′(cet+1)− u′(cut+1)) + χt
u′(cet )
(1− λ)
R
− β(1− λ)u′(cet+1 − φ1t+1u′(cet+1) + φ2t+1 = 0
which is equations (9) and (8) in text. Moreover, rearranging we get:
R
(1− λ)(β(1− λ)u
′(cet+1 + φ
1
t+1u
′(cet+1)− φ2t+1)− β(1− λ)ru′(cet+1)
−φ1t+1r(u′(cet+1)− u′(cut+1))− χt = u′(cut+1)βλr(33)
From (33) it is straightforward to derive (10).
7.2 A Dual Representation of the Worker’s Program
In order to solve the model I utilize the standard value function iteration approach.
However, for simplicity I cast the program in its dual form, considering an optimal contract
that maximizes the firms profit subject to delivering a given level of utility to the worker.
This representation is standard in the literature. The program may be written as follows:
Π(W,a) = max y − w + 1− λ
R
Π(W ′, a′)
subject to:
W ≤ u(−a
′
r
+ w − τ + a) + β((1− λ)W ′ + λU(a′, 0))
W ′ ≥ U(a′, 0) and Π(W ′, a′) ≥ 0
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In order to reduce the number of control variables I make use of the following properties:
First, I utilize the promise keeping constraint to express wages as:
w = u−1(W − β((1− λ)W ′λU(a′, 0))) + a
′
r
+ τ − a)
which allows to write:
Π(W, a) = max y − u−1(W − β((1− λ)W ′λU(a′, 0)))−a
′
r
− τ + a) + 1− λ
R
Π(W ′, a′)
(34)
Second, from (34) it is possible to show that the firms value function is linear homogeneous
in wealth. Therefore we can solve:
Π(W, 0) = max y − u−1(W − β((1− λ)W ′λU(a′, 0)))−a
′
r
− τ) + 1− λ
R
Π(W ′, 0) + a′
(35)
to recover the policy rules. Equivalently the participation constraints are W ′ ≥ U(a′, 0)
and Π(W ′, 0) + a′ ≥ 0.
Figure 1: Optimal Contract- Wage Profiles
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Wealth
W
ag
e
First Period Wage
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
1.01
Wealth
W
ag
e
Second Period Wage
Notes: The top panel shows wages at the start of the match, as a function of the wealth
endowment of the newly employed agent. The bottom panel shows the wage schedule
for every period after period one.
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Figure 2: Wealth Accumulation- Optimal vs. Flat Contract
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Notes: The solid line plots next period assets against initial wealth under the optimal
contract. The crossed line corresponds to the analogous object for the model of pre-
cautionary savings. The dashed line is the 45 degree line which indicates the stationary
wealth level.
44
Figure 3: Consumption Ratio - Optimal vs. Flat Contract
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Notes: The figure plots the ratio of consumption in unemployment over consumption
in employment. The solid line represents the optimal allocation. The crossed line
represents the optimal contract. The top panel shows the ratio as a function of wealth
after one period on the job. The bottom panel shows the average consumption loses
(weighted average across periods).
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Figure 4: Optimal Policy: Wage Path and Distribution
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Notes: The figure plots under the optimal UI scheme the wage policy of the firm (right)
and the distribution of employed individuals over the wealth space.
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Figure 5: One Quarter Policy: Wage Path and Distribution
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Notes: The figure plots shows the wage policy of the firm (right) and the distribution of
employed individuals over the wealth space. The UI scheme considered is one that sets
benefits optimally for one quarter and then offers zero benefits for longer durations.
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Figure 6: Consumption Ratios under the Optimal Policy
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Notes: The figure plots the ratio of consumption in unemployment over consumption
in employment. The top panel shows the ratio as a function of wealth after one period
on the job. The bottom panel shows the average consumption loses (weighted average
across periods).
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(b≤m, b>m). Welfare u τ
Zero Benefits (0, 0) -0.47% -4.3% -100%
Optimal Timing
m = 0 (1.165, 0.400) +0.75% +6.45% +103%
m = 1 (0.758, 0.701) +0.50% +8.38% +57%
Zero Benefits after m+ 1 quarters
m = 0 (1.168.0) 0.39% -3.70% +77%
m = 1 (0.78, 0.0) 0.40% + 3.87% +50%
Table 1: Effects of UI schemes: Optimal Allocation
Notes: The table considers the effects of various UI schemes on economic outcomes.
Zero benefits refers to a policy that eliminates unemployment insurance. Zero Bene-
fits after m quarters sets the UI payment equal to zero for durations longer than m
quarters. I report the case where m = 1 and the case where m = 2 Optimal timing
chooses optimally (b≤m, b>m)..
(b≤m, b>m). Welfare u τ
Zero Benefits (0, 0) -0.22% -3.88% -100%
Optimal Timing
m = 0 (1.165, 0.400) +0.40% + 7.60% +111%
m = 1 (0.517, 0.389) +0.17% +7.92% +13%
Zero Benefits after m+ 1 quarters
m = 0 (1.301, 0.0) 0.035% -3.55% +105%
m = 1 (0.897, 0.0) 0.064% + 6.95% + 89%
Table 2: Effects of UI schemes: Flat Wages
Notes: The table considers the effects of various UI schemes on economic outcomes.
Zero benefits refers to a policy that eliminates unemployment insurance. Zero Bene-
fits after m quarters sets the UI payment equal to zero for durations longer than m
quarters. I report the case where m = 1 and the case where m = 2 Optimal timing
chooses optimally (b≤m, b>m).
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